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Abstract: The paper analyzes a durable goods monopoly problem in which multiple varieties
can be sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, with
prots exceeding static optimal market-clearing prots and converging to this lower bound
in all stationary equilibria with instantaneous price revisions. Pricing need not be e¢ cient,
nor is it minimal (equal to the maximum of marginal cost and minimal value), and can lead
to cross-subsidization. Conclusions nest both classical Coasian insights and modern Coasian
failures. The option to scrap products does not a¤ect results qualitatively, but delivers a
novel motive for selling high cost products.
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1 Introduction
While dynamic pricing problems without commitment are well understood when a single
variety is sold in the market, multi-variety extensions thereof have often been cast as incon-
sistent with classical Coasian dynamics. Our main contributions robustly generalize classical
Coasian results to environments in which multiple varieties can be produced and sold, inte-
grating both classical Coasian insights as well as several more modern Coasian failures into
a unied framework.
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase rst brought the commitment problem of a durable good
monopolist to the attention of the academic community (Coase 1972). A monopolist unable
to commit to future prices, and having sold to high-value buyers, would be compelled to lower
prices in order to trade with buyers who did not yet purchase. As a result, forward-looking
buyers would be less inclined to pay high prices when expecting prices to fall. With frequent
price revisions, Coase originally conjectured that the implied competition from future selves
would entirely dissipate the sellers market power, leading to an opening price close to the
marginal cost and to the competitive quantity being sold in a twinkle of an eye. Formal
proofs of these statements appear in seminal papers by Stokey 1981, Fudenberg, Levine and
Tirole 1985, Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson 1986, and Ausubel and Deneckere 1989.
The present work considers the same environment originally studied by Coase, but it
presumes that the monopolist can sell more than one variety of the durable good. Such a
natural extension does not rule out any one of the three key ingredients required to obtain
classical Coasian results: lack of commitment, deteriorating market conditions, and compe-
tition from future selves willing to cut prices in the wake of market deterioration. Because
of this, our conclusions will not give rise to outright failures of classical Coasian dynamics,
but rather will qualify their content. In multi-dimensional settings, the Coasian logic will
still prevail, in that: (1) prices at which all consumers purchase a variety still commit the
seller, since the incentives to lower prices subside upon clearing the market; and (2) almost
all consumers still purchase a variety at the opening price in any stationary equilibrium when
the time between o¤ers is small. Yet, unlike with the one-variety case, these insights will
not lead to e¢ ciency, pricing at minimal valuations, or zero prots, because intratemporal
price discrimination will make up for the lack of intertemporal price discrimination, thereby
restoring some of the market power lost because of the sellers inability to commit.
Specically, we consider a monopolist with constant marginal costs who sells two varieties
of a durable good to a continuum of buyers with unit-demand for the product (results easily
extend to any nite number of varieties). Buyers are privately informed of their value for
each of the two varieties, and the distribution of values is represented by a measure that can
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exhibit an arbitrary correlation structure.1 The time horizon is innite. In every period,
the monopolist sets a price for each variety sold, while the buyers, upon observing prices,
choose which variety to purchase (if any). In the baseline setting, to favor comparability with
classical results, the marginal cost of each variety is set to zero, and consumers permanently
exit the market upon buying a product.
The analysis begins by characterizing the static problem of maximizing prots subject to
clearing the market (that is, selling a variety to every consumer in the support of the measure).
When multiple varieties are sold, optimal market-clearing prots are always strictly positive,
as it is always possible to sell one variety for free (thereby clearing the market) while using
the other variety to screen consumers and raise prots. In some instances, these prots can
coincide with monopoly prots in the commitment case.2 But in general, optimal market-
clearing prots exceed the lowest value of the durable good (that is, the smallest value of the
preferred variety) and consequently the lowest value of each of the two varieties.3 Optimal
market-clearing, however, often distorts consumption decisions as buyers purchase their least
preferred variety only because it is sold at a cheaper price.
The analysis then extends classical Coasian dynamics to our multi-dimensional setting.
Preliminary results establish that in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the dynamic game:
(1) there is skimming, as the measure of buyers in the market at any point in time is a
truncation of the original measure; and (2) the market clears instantaneously whenever the
seller sets static market-clearing prices. The latter immediately implies that optimal market-
clearing prots bound equilibrium prots in the dynamic game from below. Results also
establish that stationary equilibria always exist, and that these equilibria can display mixing
along the entire equilibrium path in order to conceal future discounts. As in classical Coasian
settings, though, when the time between o¤ers converges to zero, stationary equilibrium
prots always converge to optimal market-clearing prots, and prots accrue by selling almost
instantaneously to almost all buyers.
Our Coasian dynamics are reminiscent of the classical results for the one-variety case, with
two distinct scenarios. In the gaps case (when the lowest value in the support exceeds the
marginal cost), the market clears in nite time, equilibrium prots are positive and unique,
and they converge to the lowest valuation as the time between o¤ers converges to zero. In the
no-gaps case (when the lowest value does not exceed the marginal cost), the market clears
in innite time, a Folk Theorem applies to equilibrium prots, and stationary equilibrium
1The set-up accommodates several commonly used designs such as vertical product di¤erentiation (when
consumersvaluations for the two products are positively correlated) and horizontal product di¤erentiation
(when the valuations are negatively correlated).
2For instance, this is often the case when varieties are horizontally di¤erentiated.
3For instance, this always occurs when independent varieties share a common minimal valuation.
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prots converge to zero. Multi-variety settings closely resemble the single-variety gaps case
even when some buyers value both varieties at zero, although there are some signicant
di¤erences. First, unlike in the one-variety case, the seller does not lose any bargaining power
from lack of commitment as long as optimal market-clearing prots coincide with optimal
prots. Moreover: equilibrium prots are positive at high frequencies of price-revision even
when there are no gaps; having gaps no longer guarantees equilibrium uniqueness, as several
market-clearing prices may be optimal; and, stationary equilibria may display mixing after
the initial period as the seller attempts to conceal future discounts. As in the one-variety
case, though, the assumption on gaps still determines the time it takes for the market to
clear, which is nite with gaps, but not necessarily nite without.
The second part of the analysis extends the baseline model and contextualizes our contri-
bution. First, it generalizes results to settings with positive marginal costs. Similar conclu-
sions hold as in the zero marginal cost case, but equilibria may display cross-subsidization,
with one variety being sold above its marginal cost and the other below. Then, results are
extended to settings in which consumers remain in the market after purchasing a variety.
This is done by suitably adjusting the denition of static market-clearing. Clearing the mar-
ket in such settings requires setting prices such that: (1) all buyers purchase a variety; and
(2) the marginal cost of either variety exceeds the value of switching between varieties for
every buyer. Thus, allowing consumers to remain in the market can bound mark-ups relative
to our earlier analysis, but it does not restore e¢ ciency when marginal costs are positive.
As high marginal cost varieties can enlarge the size of the market-clearing set, a novel ratio-
nale emerges for producing high cost varieties, given that such products favor intratemporal
price discrimination by preventing future price cuts. The nal extension also claries why
Coasian dynamics should not be summarized as optimal market-clearing (or agreement), but
rather as renegotiation-proof agreement.4 The analysis concludes by relating to classical
Coasian conclusions and to some well-known Coasian failures and by nesting these within
our framework.
A key insight of the analysis relates optimal market-clearing to stationary pricing in the
dynamic game when price revisions are frequent. This observation can be leveraged to deliver
testable predictions about approximate equilibrium pricing in durable goods markets. In the
online appendix, we exploit this insight to investigate the optimal design of product lines. We
establish that optimal designs must involve horizontal product di¤erentiation, and that in
contrast to the one-variety case, volatility in valuations can occasionally benet the seller. To
the best of our knowledge, these are the rst theoretical attempts at analyzing the incentives
4In classical bargaining settings, agreement refers to the seller trading with every buyer whose value
exceeds the marginal cost. In multi-variety settings, agreement amounts to market-clearing, or equivalently,
to the depletion of gains from trade.
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to develop product lines in the context of a dynamic pricing model.5
A vast literature presents tactics to circumvent the monopolists commitment problem.
Such tactics typically involve preventing the market from fully deteriorating in order to al-
low the monopolist to sustain higher prots.6 Most closely related to this paper are Board
and Pycia 2014, Hahn 2006, Inderst 2008, Takeyama 2002, and Wang 1998. Three of these
provide examples in which the monopolist successfully mitigates its commitment problem
in multi-variety settings by selling vertically di¤erentiated products (with two types of con-
sumers, Hahn 2006 and Inderst 2008, and with two periods, Takeyama 2002). All three focus
primarily on the possibility of strategically changing the quality of the goods (via upgrades
or downgrades). Our framework is able to nest these conclusions since vertical product di¤er-
entiation is a feasible design. Therefore, in our view, their results should not be interpreted
as failures of the Coase conjecture. Rather, they display the essence of the Coasian insight,
which is optimal market-clearing (or agreement), and not e¢ ciency or minimal pricing.
Similarly, Board and Pycia 2014 shows that a durable goods monopolist never cuts its
price if an outside option with strictly positive value is available for free. Their conclusions
can also be nested within our framework. Indeed, because any price set by the monopolist
clears the market when an outside option is freely available, the monopolist not undercutting
its initial price would be consistent with the proposed extension of the Coase conjecture. Of
course, by pricing the outside option, the monopolist would be able to achieve a higher prot,
as both varieties would be optimally sold at positive prices when there are gaps (which is
the case in their setting). Similar considerations apply to Wang 1998, which establishes an
instantaneous clearing result (evocative of Board and Pycia 2014) in a two-type model. As
before, these and other related results have been cast as Coasian failures. Yet in our inter-
pretation, these observations capture features of multi-dimensional Coasian generalizations,
and not failures thereof.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the
solution concepts. Section 3 characterizes optimal market-clearing prots when marginal
costs are zero. Section 4 solves the dynamic pricing game and presents our Coasian results
when marginal costs are zero. Section 5 extends conclusions to settings with positive marginal
5Seminal references for static design questions are Mussa and Rosen 1978, Deneckere and McAfee 1996,
and Johnson and Myatt 2016. A stylized dynamic exercise in House and Ozdenoren 2008 establishes the
optimality of mass products in one-variety settings.
6Seminal studies have shown that the market does not fully deteriorate: by renting the good, Bulow
1982; by introducing best-price provisions, Butz 1990; by introducing new versions of the durable good,
Levinthaland and Purohit 1989, Waldman 1993 and 1996, Choi 1994, Fudenberg and Tirole 1998, and Lee
and Lee 1998; with capacity constraints, Kahn 1986 and McAfee and Wiseman 2008; with entry of new
buyers, Sobel 1991; with time-varying buyers valuations, Biehl 2001, Deb 2011, and Garrett 2016; with
time-varying costs, Ortner 2014; with depreciation, Bond and Samuelson 1984; and with discrete demand,
Bagnoli, Salant and Swierzbinski 1989, Fehr and Kuhn 1995, and Montez 2013.
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costs as well as to settings in which buyers remain active upon purchasing a variety. Section
6 relates to classical Coasian results and their failures, and then concludes. Proofs of lemmas
and propositions appear in the appendix, Section 7. Results on the optimal design of varieties
and proofs of remarks are deferred to the online appendix.
2 A Market with Di¤erentiated Varieties
A monopolist produces and sells two varieties of a durable good, a and b. A unit measure
of non-atomic consumers has unit-demand for the durable good. Time is discrete, the time-
horizon is innite, and all players discount the future by a common factor . Consumers
are completely pinned down by their value prole v = (va; vb), where vi denotes the value of
consuming variety i 2 fa; bg. Value proles are private information of consumers. A measure
F , dened on the unit square [0; 1]2, describes the distribution of value proles among buyers.
Throughout, denote by F its associated cumulative distribution and by V its support.7 To
simplify parts of the discussion, some results require the measure F to be non-atomic.
Condition 1 The market is said to be regular if F admits a density f satisfying f(v) 2  f; f
for any v 2 V , and if the support V is convex.
Regularity implies that the measure F is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure L on [0; 1]2, and that there exists a bounded and strictly positive density on the
entire support V . Weaker, albeit more involved, conditions could be imposed to discipline the
measure only on the relevant parts of the support. We opted for a stronger but more elegant
condition, while qualifying its role throughout analysis.8 Denote the marginal cumulative
distribution of variety i by Fi, its support by Vi, and its density, when it exists, by fi.
In the baseline setting, buyers have unit-demand for the product and exit the market
upon purchasing either of the two varieties.9 Thus, the nal payo¤ of a buyer purchasing
variety i 2 fa; bg, at a price pi, in date t simply amounts to t (vi   pi), while the payo¤ of
a buyer never purchasing a variety simply amounts to 0. The monopolists marginal cost
of producing variety i 2 fa; bg is constant and is denoted by ci 2 [0; 1]. Marginal costs are
common knowledge. Units are produced when sold in order to minimize production costs,
and the monopolists payo¤ simply amounts to the present discounted value of future prots.
7The support identies the smallest closed set whose complement has probability zero.
8Our regularity condition di¤ers from the classical assumptions imposed on the single-variety case in
Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson 1986. Moreover, the two assumptions cannot be nested as their conditions
are stronger but local, whereas we impose weaker conditions but on the entire support. Our condition is,
instead, a natural extension of the assumptions in Fundenberg, Levine and Tirole 1984.
9We discuss which conclusions are a¤ected by the permanent exit assumption in Section 4.
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To keep the action set of the seller compact, the price of each variety at any date t is chosen
from the interval [!; 1], for some ! < 0.10
Thus, in every period: the rm sets a price in [!; 1] for each of the two varieties produced
in order to maximize the expected present value of future prots; and consumers who have
not previously purchased a product choose whether to buy either of the two varieties at
current prices in order to maximize their expected present value.
Information Structure and Solution Concepts: Players observe the prices set by the
monopolist in every previous period. A t-period seller-history, ht, species for every period
s 2 f0; :::; t 1g the prices that were set by the seller for each of the two varieties of the durable
good. A t-period buyer-history for a player who has yet to purchase a variety, h^t, consists
of a history ht followed by the prices announced by the monopolist at date t. Denote the
set of t-period seller-histories by H t = [!; 1]2t and the set of seller histories by H = [1t=0H t.
Similarly, denote the set of t-period buyer-histories by H^ t = [!; 1]2t+2 and the set of buyer
histories by H^ = [1t=0H^ t.
As is customary in the literature, we impose measurability restrictions on joint consumers
strategies which require the set of consumers purchasing variety i 2 fa; bg at any possible
history to be a measurable set. For a metric spaceX, denote by P(X) the set of all probability
measures on (X;
(X)), where 
(X) denotes the Borel sigma-algebra. Similarly, denote by
P(X) the set of all measures on (X;
(X)). A behavioral pure strategy prole for buyers
consists of a function  : H^  V ! f0; a; bg such that (h^; ) is measurable for any h^ 2 H^.
Action 0 is to be interpreted as the decision not to buy any product in the current period.
Actions a and b respectively denote the decision to purchase variety a or b in the current
period. Intuitively,  determines consumption decisions of buyers at every possible history.
Behavioral mixed strategies at any history then consist of probability distributions over such
measurable functions. A behavioral strategy prole for the monopolist consists of a function
satisfying  : H ! P([!; 1]2), where  determines the probability distribution over prices
charged by the monopolist as a function of the history of play.
Any strategy prole f; g generates a path of prices and sales which can be computed
recursively. Given a mixed strategy prole f; g, let Di(ht) 2 P(V ) denote the measure
of consumers purchasing variety i 2 fa; bg at any buyer-history ht, and let Di(ht) denote its
support. Consumers with value prole v 2 V are active at history ht if they have not yet
purchased a variety of the durable good. Formally, dene the measure of active buyers A(ht)
at a given history ht as
A(Ejht) = F(E) Pt 1s=0 [Da(Ejhs) +Db(Ejhs)] for any E 2 
(V ),
10Of course, despite ! < 0, prices will be non-negative in equilibrium.
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where hs denotes the sub-history of length s of ht. Let A(ht) denote the support of this
measure. When clarity is not compromised, we omit the dependence on the history and we
denote these measures and supports simply by Dti , Dti , At and At. For any strategy prole
f; g, let (; jh) be the expected present value of prots generated after history h, and
let U(; jh^; v) be the expected present value of the surplus of an active buyer v who chooses
not to buy any variety at history h^. When an equilibrium strategy is xed, we omit the
dependence on strategies and denote by (h) the expected present value of prots and by
U(h^; v) the continuation value of player v.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (equivalently a PBE) consists of a mixed strategy prole
f; g and updated beliefs about the measure of active buyers satisfying the two standard
requirements: that strategies are optimal given beliefs, and that beliefs are derived from
strategies according to Bayes rule whenever possible.11 To guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium, players are allowed to mix at any stage of the game.
With the proposed information structure, buyersdeviations cannot be detected by the
seller. In this respect, the paper is closest to the classical asymmetric information bargain-
ing model in Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole 1985. Yet, rather than having a single buyer,
our model preserves the durable goods interpretation by retaining a measure of buyers. Be-
cause buyersdeviations cannot be detected, no further renements are invoked. If buyers
deviations were detectable, however, similar conclusions would hold for equilibria in which
deviations by non-atomic subsets of buyers have no e¤ect on future play.12 In any such
equilibrium, the path of play would still coincide with the path of play in a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of our model, given that playersstrategies prescribe optimal behavior after all
histories with non-atomic deviations. Consequently, unilateral deviations by non-atomic buy-
ers would not a¤ect the actions of the remaining consumers, their beliefs, or the actions of
the monopolist.
In general, the buyersequilibrium strategies depend on the entire history of play (as the
entire history can a¤ect beliefs about future prices). Ausubel and Deneckere 1989 show that
a Folk Theorem can hold in this class of games, even when a single variety is for sale, if no
additional restrictions are imposed on the solution concept.13 As a similar logic applies to
settings with multiple varieties, it is convenient to consider stationary equilibria in which the
monopolist does not exploit changes in buyersbeliefs in order to commit to a given price
11By consistency, at any buyer history h^t, buyersbeliefs about prices set at date t+ s amount to 1(h^t) =
(h^t) for s = 1 and to s(h^t) =
R
(h^t+s)
Qs 1
r=1 d
r(pt+rjh^t+r 1) for s 2 f2; 3; :::g.
12In classical durable goods settings (such as Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson 1986 and Ausubel and De-
neckere 1989), every deviation is detectable. To deal with the implied complications, a renement is invoked
restricting attention to equilibria in which deviations by subsets of active buyers with measure zero change
neither the actions of the remaining buyers nor those of the seller.
13The Folk theorem holds in the single-variety case when some buyers do not value the good.
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path. As is customary in the literature, therefore, the results on Coasian dynamics rely on
a common class of Markovian equilibria. Dene a weak Markov equilibrium (equivalently a
WME) to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the strategy of active buyers depends
only on the current price prole.14 As in the single-variety case, the solution concept does
not require that buyersbeliefs only depend on current prices (as such a restriction would
compromise existence). For instance, beliefs may depend on the entire history of play when
the seller deviates to setting prices that had been quoted in one of previous periods. Further,
the solution concept does not impose restrictions on the sellers strategy which can depend on
the entire history of play. Nevertheless, because buyersdecisions only condition on current
prices, the price evolution will only depend on current prices on the equilibrium path when
both varieties trade.
3 Optimal Market-Clearing
We begin by dening the set of static market-clearing prices and discussing some of its
properties. Such prices will play an important role in the analysis of the dynamic pricing
problem at hand. Sections 3 and 4 focus on the case in which marginal costs equal zero.
Throughout, when denoting by i a generic variety in fa; bg, we denote by j 6= i the other
variety. A market-clearing price is a price prole that clears the market when the seller
commits to setting such prices for the innite future. Equivalently, it is a price prole that
clears the market in the static version of the model. Formally, the static demand di(p) for a
variety i 2 fa; bg given a price prole p satises
di(p) 2 [F(vi   pi > maxfvj   pj; 0g);F(vi   pi  maxfvj   pj; 0g)].
The demand equation does not impose tie-breaking assumptions for indi¤erent consumers.15
The set of market-clearing pricesM consists of those prices at which every consumer is willing
to purchase at least one of the two varieties:
M =

p 2 R2 j maxi2fa;bg fvi   pig  0 for all v 2 V
	
.
Let vi denote the minimal value for variety i in the support V . With only one variety, the
highest market-clearing price always coincides with the minimal value in the support. With
more than one variety, any price prole p in which one variety is sold at a price that does
14That is, a WME is a PBE in which, at any two histories (p; h); (p; h0) 2 H^, we have that ((p; h); v) =
((p; h0); v) for all v 2 A(p; h) \A(p; h0).
15When the market is regular, tie-breaking assumptions are entirely inconsequential.
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not exceed its minimal value is a market-clearing price. Formally, pi  vi implies p 2M .
When the valuations of the two varieties are independently distributed, at least one of the
two varieties must be sold at a price below its minimal value for the market to clear (Figure
1, Panel 1). This need not be the case in general, though. For instance, when the values of
the two varieties display perfect negative correlation, market-clearing prices exist in which
both varieties are sold at prices that strictly exceed their respective minimal values (Figure
1, Panel 3). For a consumer v 2 V , dene the value of the durable good as the value of the
preferred variety (that is, vg = maxi2fa;bg vi). Then, the minimal value of the durable good
amounts to
vg = minv2V maxi2fa;bg vi.
The minimal value of the durable good always exceeds the minimal value of each variety
(that is, vg  maxi2fa;bg vi). Moreover, if p 2 M , at least one variety must sell at a price
smaller than vg (that is, mini2fa;bg pi  vg), because the market clears.
(1) Independence (2) Concordance (3) Discordance
Figure 1: For three possible distributions: in pink, the set of market-clearing prices M ; in
blue, the support V .16
Optimal market-clearing prices, p, are market-clearing prices that maximize static monopoly
prots. Formally, an optimal market-clearing price is dened as a solution to the following
static prot maximization problem:
p 2 arg maxp2M [da(p)pa + db(p)pb]. (1)
Optimal market-clearing prices may fail to exist when regularity is violated, as extrema may
never be attained. Therefore, dene the supremum of this problem as the optimal market-
clearing prot, . Optimal market-clearing prots always exist, as prots are nonnegative
and necessarily bounded above by 1. The next result bounds optimal market-clearing prots
16A distribution is discordant if its support is a decreasing set (that is, if va > v0a implies vb  v0b for
all v; v0 2 V ), and concordant if its support is an increasing set (that is, if va > v0a implies vb  v0b for all
v; v0 2 V ).
10
from below when more than one variety is for sale. The proof does not rely on assumptions
on the measure F and includes scenarios in which the market is not regular. We say that
varieties are identical if their values coincide for all buyers (that is, if va = vb for any v 2 V ).
We say that varieties are unranked if not all buyers weakly prefer one variety to the other
(that is, if for any i there is a v 2 V such that vi > vj).
Remark 1 Optimal market-clearing prots:
(1) weakly exceed vg;
(2) strictly exceed maxi2fa;bg vi if varieties are unranked;
(3) equal mini2fa;bg vi if and only if varieties are identical;
(4) equal 0 if and only if varieties are identical and (0; 0) 2 V ;
(5) strictly exceed vg if varieties are not identical, va = vb, and (va; vb) 2 V .
The monopolist can always clear the market by selling both varieties at price vg. So, optimal
prots must weakly exceed the minimal value of the durable good, and consequently the
minimal value of every variety. When varieties are unranked, the seller can raise higher
prots while clearing the market by selling both varieties at prices that exceed the largest
minimal value, one of them strictly so. When varieties are identical, optimal market-clearing
prots must be equal to mini2fa;bg vi = vg as all buyers purchase the cheapest variety. But
otherwise, prots always strictly exceed the smallest of the two minimal values, since market-
clearing prices exist in which both varieties are sold, with one variety sold at a price that
strictly exceeds the smallest minimal value. Because vi  0 for any variety i, optimal market-
clearing prots can therefore be equal to 0 if and only if varieties are identical and (0; 0) 2 V .
By a similar logic, optimal market-clearing prots strictly exceed even the minimal value
of the durable good when varieties are di¤erentiated, minimal values coincide, and a single
buyer has the smallest possible value for both varieties.17
Remark 1 hints at why the Coasian intuition about the seller eventually depleting the
market does not necessarily lead to zero prots or to pricing at minimal values when dif-
ferentiated varieties can be produced and sold. Although a monopolist lacking commitment
may still have to clear the market, market-clearing no longer requires that prots coincide
with minimal valuations. Indeed, when the market is regular, optimal market-clearing prots
always strictly exceed the smallest minimal valuation; and under mild conditions, such prof-
its strictly exceed even the minimal valuation of the durable good. Moreover, commitment
prots can coincide with optimal market-clearing prots when price discrimination gains are
small relative to the minimal value of the durable good (as in Panel 3 of Figure 2).
17A model in which willingness to pay can be determined by budget constraints could deliver va = vb and
(va; vb) 2 V .
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A market-clearing price prole is said to be e¢ cient if every buyer purchases its preferred
variety. Formally, the set of e¢ cient price proles simply amounts to
M = fp 2M j vi  vj ) vi   pi  vj   pj for all v 2 V g .
We refer to such prices as e¢ cient as they maximize utilitarian social welfare.18 Any market-
clearing price p 2 M such that pa = pb is obviously always e¢ cient. Furthermore, no other
price can be e¢ cient when va = vb for some v 2 V . Although e¢ cient market-clearing prices
always exist, optimal market-clearing need not be e¢ cient. For instance, when a single buyer
has the smallest possible value for both varieties and the minimal values coincide, optimal
market-clearing prices are necessarily ine¢ cient, provided that varieties are di¤erentiated.
Remark 2 Optimal market-clearing prices are ine¢ cient if:
 varieties are not identical, V is connected, va = vb, and (va; vb) 2 V ;
 varieties are unranked and V = [va; va] [vb; vb].
(1) Ine¢ cient (2) Ine¢ cient (3) E¢ cient
Figure 2: For three possible distributions: in red, optimal market-clearing prices; in green,
buyers purchasing the ine¢ cient variety at the optimal market-clearing price.
The ine¢ ciency of optimal market-clearing prices is a generic phenomenon when the
support is a Cartesian product. The result hints at why the generalizations of Coasian logic
may not necessarily lead to e¢ ciency if the main force disciplining dynamic pricing were
shown to be optimal market-clearing. Of course, if varieties were identical, optimal market-
clearing prices would be e¢ cient simply because the market clears. This is not the case with
di¤erentiated products. Figure 2 depicts two instances of ine¢ ciency in Panels 1 and 2, with
independent and vertically di¤erentiated products respectively, while Panel 3 shows why we
had to assume (va; vb) 2 V in order to guarantee frictions.
18As utility is transferrable and costs equal zero, an e¢ cient price always maximizes surplus, since all
buyers get to purchase their preferred variety.
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4 Coasian Dynamics as Market-Clearing
This section extends classical Coasian results to settings with multiple varieties. It establishes
that the market for the durable good must eventually clear even when multiple varieties can be
sold. The intuition coincides with that of seminal Coasian results. As the monopolist cannot
commit to future prices, the market must clear, or else clearing the market would become a
protable deviation as soon as the seller no longer expects to trade. In a multi-variety setting,
however, market-clearing no longer implies that prots are minimal. Indeed, perfect Bayesian
equilibrium prots always exceed optimal market-clearing prots, and they converge to such
prots in any weak Markovian equilibrium as price revisions become arbitrarily frequent.
These results highlight why lack of commitment and Coasian pricing do not necessarily lead
to minimal-valuation pricing or e¢ ciency, but only to market-clearing and agreement. When
price revisions are frequent, the monopolist will simply choose the prot-maximizing way to
supply all buyers. As in the single-variety case, having gaps will guarantee that all buyers
are supplied in nite time. In contrast to the classical case, though, the market can clear in
nite time even when there are no gaps.
We begin the analysis with a few preliminary results that unveil some important features
of equilibrium strategies in this dynamic pricing game. As in the classical single-variety
setting, the measure of active buyers must be a truncation of the original measure, and
equilibrium play displays a specic form of top-down skimming of the market. In particular,
at every possible history, a cuto¤ identies the smallest value buyer who is willing to purchase
a variety in the set fv 2 R2 j va   vb = kg for all values of k 2 R. Thus, every subset of buyers
with a given value di¤erence k will be skimmed from the top down as a result of equilibrium
play. To show this, we introduce a general notion of multidimensional truncation. We say
that a measure F 0 is a truncation of F if for some set A  
(V ),
F 0(E) = F(E \ A) for any E 2 
(V ).
Lemma 1 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, at any buyer-history h:
(1) if buyer v strictly prefers to buy variety i, so does any active buyer v0 such that
v0i   vi  maxf0; v0j   vjg;
(2) if buyer v prefers to buy a variety, any active buyer v0 > v strictly prefers to buy if
maxi2fa;bgfv0i   vig < mini2fa;bgfv0i   vig;
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(3) if buyer v prefers not to buy, any active buyer v0 < v strictly prefers not to buy if
maxi2fa;bgfvi   v0ig < mini2fa;bgfvi   v0ig;
(4) if the market is regular, the measure of active buyers is a truncation of F .
The proof of the lemma is intuitive. If a buyer with value v was willing to purchase variety i
at current prices, the same should hold for any active buyer v0 > v provided that the relative
value for the two varieties is similar. In fact, by delaying, buyer v0 could capture at most
maxifv0i vig on top of the continuation value of buyer v. If so, however, buying now should
be preferable, as buyer v0 would capture minifv0i   vig more surplus than v. This naturally
follows, as delay costs are higher for high value consumers, and implies that the measure of
active buyers must be a truncation whenever F is non-atomic. However, stronger notions of
skimming would not apply. For instance, it is not in general the case that v buying a variety
and v0 > v together imply that v0 buys a variety. The active player set in the left panel of
Figure 3 would violate this more stringent skimming requirement, as there are values v who
purchase variety a and values v0 > v who do not purchase any variety. This occurs naturally
in equilibrium when buyer v0 prefers to wait to purchase good b at a lower price in the future.
Still, whenever buyer v strictly prefers to purchase variety i, so do all the buyers v0 who have
a higher value for i, provided that the change in value for variety i exceeds that for variety
j (equivalently, v0i   vi  v0j   vj). A similar logic also implies that if a buyer v does not buy
any variety, neither does any buyer v0 < v with a similar relative value for the two varieties.
(1) Active Players (2) Truncation Lemma
Figure 3: For a market clearing in period t+ 1: in blue At+1, the active buyer set; in green
Dta, those who purchase variety a; and in orange D
t
b.
The left panel of Figure 3 depicts the set of types purchasing each of the two varieties,
along with the active player set for a market that clears in the following period. The red lines
identify buyers that are indi¤erent between purchasing di¤erent varieties at di¤erent dates.
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The right panel depicts parts (1) and (3) of Lemma 1: if a dot belongs to one of the three
regions, then the corresponding triangle must also belong to that region.
The next lemma relates features of equilibrium pricing to static market-clearing. The key
observation establishes why static market-clearing prices must also clear the market in any
equilibrium of the dynamic model. This immediately delivers two central conclusions. First,
the monopolist never sets prices in the interior of the static market-clearing set. Second,
optimal market-clearing prots bound prots from below in any equilibrium, at any history
and for any possible discount factor. To state the result, let M denote the interiorof the
market-clearing price set M , or equivalently,
M =

p 2 R2 j maxi2fa;bg fvi   pig > 0 for all v 2 V
	
.
Given any history h and its associated active player set A, let (A) denote the optimal
market-clearing prot for the residual measure of buyers F(A). When the market is regular,
(A) simply amounts to
(A) = maxp2M
P
i2fa;bg piF(vi   pi > vj   pjjA).
Lemma 2 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, at any seller-history h:
(1) all active buyers purchase a variety if prices are in M ;
(2) the monopolist never sets prices in M ;
(3) the present value of prots satises
(h)  (A).
Equilibrium prots must weakly exceed optimal market-clearing prots for any discount
factor  < 1. As in the single-variety setting, the inability to commit to future prices (and
the implied inability to intertemporally price discriminate forward-looking buyers) can still
hurt the seller. Market-clearing and intratemporal price discrimination, however, shield the
seller from further prot declines. In fact, even when the minimal value for the durable
good equals zero (vg = 0), equilibrium prots cannot be competitive, and the allocation
may be ine¢ cient. This contrasts with a classical interpretation of the Coase conjecture for
single-variety settings with no gaps, which requires equilibrium pricing to be approximately
competitive and approximately e¢ cient when buyers are arbitrarily patient. As the rest of
the analysis claries, however, the Coasian logic persists to the extent that agreement and
market-clearing still dictate equilibrium pricing. An immediate implication of Lemma 2 is
that the seller cannot lose bargaining power because of its inability to commit to future prices
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when optimal market-clearing prots coincide with monopoly prots. The proof of Lemma
2 identies the set of price proles which are immediately accepted by all buyers regardless
of their beliefs; it also establishes by contradiction that the closure of this set must include
all static market-clearing prices because of consumer discounting.19
To grasp the full connection between known Coasian results and their failures, it is in-
structive to consider a few more observations. The next lemma establishes that the market
must eventually clear, and that it must do so in nite time whenever the minimal value of
the durable good vg is strictly positive (call this the gaps case). The same result holds with
a single variety when the smallest buyers valuation is strictly positive. In contrast to the
one-variety setting, though: the market clears in nite time even when the minimal value of
both varieties equals zero, provided that vg > 0; and it may take innite time to clear the
market even when equilibrium prots are positive (which is generally the case, by Lemma
2 and Remark 1). The result, however, does not imply that the market will take innitely
many periods to clear whenever vg = 0 (call this the no-gaps case).
Lemma 3 If the market is regular, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
(1) every buyer v 2 V purchases a variety as time diverges to innity;
(2) if vg > 0, every buyer v 2 V purchases a variety in nite time.
The monopolist eventually sells to all buyers in any equilibrium, because otherwise, instan-
taneously clearing the market would be protable whenever the measure of active buyers is
close to a limit. When the measure of active buyers is small and vg > 0, the monopolist
benets from clearing the market instantaneously. This is the case because only buyers with
similar valuations remain active as time elapses, and because the loss caused by discounting
future prots outweighs any possible price discrimination when buyers are similar and vg
is strictly positive. However, despite equilibrium prots being positive in any support, the
market does not need to clear instantaneously when vg = 0 even when all active buyers are
similar. To see this, let  = 0 and consider a uniform measure on the support V = [0; "]2. In
such settings, the market cannot clear instantaneously, regardless of the value of ".20 How-
ever, in contrast to the one-variety case, vg = 0 no longer implies that the market cannot
clear instantaneously. In particular, the market would clear instantaneously if  = 1=2 and
the measure was uniform on V = [0; "] [0; 1]2 for some su¢ ciently small ". If so, the seller
secures a payo¤ close to the optimal commitment prot by clearing the market instanta-
neously, but it necessarily loses some surplus due to discounting when deferring trade with
some buyers of variety b.
19This is a common feature of many bargaining models, dating back to Rubinsteins 1982 seminal work.
20In particular, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, for any variety i 2 fa; bg, the seller sets price p0i = "=
p
3
at date zero and price pti = p
t 1
i =
p
3 at any date t > 0 on the equilibrium path.
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As in the single-variety case, it is possible to show that perfect Bayesian equilibria exist
and that at least one of these equilibria is weakly Markovian. The next result proves directly
the existence of a weak Markov equilibrium, which implies the existence of perfect Bayesian
equilibria. The proof applies also to the no-gaps case, vg = 0.
Proposition 1 If the market is regular, a weak Markov equilibrium exists.
The proof strategy is classical and evocative of the single-variety case. When there are
gaps, the equilibrium is nite, and thus backward induction and a suitable variant of the
Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg xed point theorem su¢ ces to establish existence. When there are
no gaps, the equicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence is further exploited to deliver
the result. Stationary equilibria are not necessarily unique in multi-variety settings, since
optimal market-clearing prices are not unique in general.
In contrast to classical results for the single-variety case, stationary mixed strategy equi-
libria may exist in which the seller randomizes along the equilibrium path (and not just in
the initial period). This is the case because the monopolist may benet from concealing
future price reductions if buyers delay purchasing those varieties that are going to be more
heavily discounted. At the end of this section, we display an instance of this phenomenon for
a market that clears in two periods and in which the seller randomizes in the nal period,
upon clearing the market.
The nal result about the baseline dynamic pricing game delivers a generalization of the
classical Coasian insight to multi-variety settings. In any stationary equilibrium, the sellers
prot must always converge to the optimal market-clearing prot as the discount factor con-
verges to unity. As in the single-variety setting, patience deteriorates the sellers bargaining
power and decreases its equilibrium prot. Because of Lemma 2 though, the inability to
intertemporally price discriminate buyers does not fully erode the sellers bargaining power
when more than one variety can be sold.
Proposition 2 If the market is regular, prots converge to optimal market-clearing prots
in any weak Markov equilibrium as  converges to 1.
The proof establishes that when the discount factor is close to 1, prices must be close to
market-clearing after any real time T . Thus, prots will be close to market-clearing as patient
consumers would wait any nite amount of time for a price reduction, and consequently
varieties will only ever be sold at prices that are close to market-clearing. The intuition for
this result is as follows. Consider a time period t in which the demand for both products is
small. A possible deviation for the monopolist in period t consists of setting prices according
to its mixed strategy in period t + 1 rather than setting the equilibrium price pt. Such a
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deviation would have three e¤ects on the prot of the monopolist. First, it would reduce
prots by lowering the price paid by those who were expecting to consume a variety i at date
t and continue to do so. Second, it would increase prots by anticipating the stream of future
revenue on all units to be sold at later stages. Third, it would have an ambiguous e¤ect on
prots by inducing some consumers to change their demand from one product to the other.
The rst e¤ect, however, is small, as price changes must be small if a patient consumer is
unwilling to wait one period to purchase the product. Similarly, the third e¤ect must be small
(if positive), because the set of buyers contemplating switching varieties is a small subset of
those contemplating a purchase when price changes are small (by absolute continuity). Thus,
for such a deviation not to be protable, prots must be arbitrarily small after a nite time
T . If so, prices must be close to market-clearing after date T , given that equilibrium prots
exceed market-clearing prots by Lemma 2 and given that optimal market-clearing prots
can be small only if the measure of active buyers is small by Remark 1. If buyers are patient,
the latter implies that prices must be close to market-clearing from the beginning of the game
for sales to take place before date T .
As in classical settings, a monopolist lacking commitment extracts no more than optimal
market-clearing prots in any stationary equilibrium when price revisions can be arbitrarily
frequent. However, stationary pricing without commitment only amounts to optimal market-
clearing and global agreement, not to minimal pricing or e¢ ciency.
On-Path Mixing Example: We conclude the section by constructing a stationary equi-
librium in which the seller randomizes in the nal period. Consider an atomic measure of
buyers with support
V = (1; 1) [ v 2 [0; 1]2 j vj = (1  vi)=3 for any vi 2 [1=4; 1] & any i 2 fa; bg	 .
The dark blue region in the left panel of Figure 4 depicts this support. Although the measure
fails regularity, a similar conclusion would hold in the regular market in which the support is
the convex hull of V (the light blue shaded region in the left plot of Figure 4) and in which
almost all of the measure is on V . Consider the following joint distribution on V :
F (v) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if vi = 1 & vj = 1
(6vi + 6vj   3)=10 if vi 2 [1=4; 1] & vj 2 [1=4; 1)
(18vj + 6vi   6)=10 if vi 2 [1=4; 1] & vj 2 [1  3vi; 1=4]
0 if otherwise
.
Intuitively, such a distribution has 1=10 of the measure on the atom at (1; 1), while 9=10 of
the measure is uniformly distributed on the other component of V .
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Optimal market-clearing prots in this market amount to 0:272 (approximately) and can
be secured via two symmetric market-clearing price proles, with one variety sold at 5=12 and
the other at 7=36. If instead the seller had the ability to commit to a price prole, it would
optimally sell both varieties at a price of 13=24 and raise a prot of 0:352 (approximately). As
in the one-variety case, the sellers bargaining power is diminished by its inability to commit
to the price path (at least for su¢ ciently high values of ). However, optimal market-clearing
prots exceed both the minimal value of the durable good, as vg = 0:25, and the minimal
value of each variety, as va = vb = 0. Intratemporal price discrimination partly o¤sets the
inability to intertemporally price discriminate.
(1) Support (2) Buying Regions
Figure 4: On the left, the support of a measure with late mixing; on the right, values
partitioned into buying regions. In each region, the letter stands for the variety purchased
(where c denotes the cheapest variety) and the number stands for the date of purchase.
When  = 3=4, the stationary equilibrium that maximizes the payo¤ of the seller in the
dynamic pricing game entails stochastically clearing the market in exactly two periods. In
this equilibrium, the monopolist sells both varieties in the rst period at a price equal to
311=864, and it clears the market in the second period by setting one of two market-clearing
price proles, (73=216; 143=648) and (143=648; 73=216), with equal probability. By doing so,
the seller secures a prot of approximately 0:292. The right panel of Figure 4 partitions
values into buying regions for a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the market clears in two
periods.
Mixed strategy equilibrium prots exceed the prot that the seller can secure in any
stationary pure strategy equilibrium, which only amounts to approximately 0:288. The loss
of prot stems from the following intuition. When  = 3=4, in all stationary equilibria,
the market clears in two periods, and buyers with value (1; 1) necessarily purchase in the
rst period. But if so, buyers with value (1; 1) are unwilling to pay much more than the
lowest market-clearing price set in the second period in any pure equilibrium, or the average
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market-clearing price set in the second period in any mixed equilibrium. For suitably chosen
values of , this e¤ect depresses the price that can be charged for the cheaper variety in the
rst period in a pure strategy equilibrium, implying that clearing the market stochastically
can benet the seller. The details of this example are reported in the online appendix.
5 Extensions: Costs and Market Exit
Positive Marginal Costs: The key insights discussed in the previous sections carry over
to settings with strictly positive marginal costs. However, a few signicant di¤erences arise.
In general, our notion of market-clearing only required that gains from trade be depleted.
Consequently, market-clearing no longer requires selling to all buyers when marginal costs
are positive. Rather, it requires selling a variety at the current prices to all buyers who value
at least one variety more than its marginal cost. In particular, denote by V + the set of values
with positive gains from trade:
V + =

v 2 V j maxi2fa;bg fvi   cig  0
	
.
When marginal costs are positive, the set of market-clearing prices then amounts to
M+ =

p 2 R2 j maxi2fa;bg fvi   pig  0 for all v 2 V +
	
.
A price p in the interior of the support V can now clear the market, but no price in the
interior of V + clears the market. As displayed in Figure 5, any price p  c clears the market
even when it is interior to the support V . Market-clearing prices (even optimal ones) may
display cross-subsidization, which amounts to selling one variety below marginal cost while
selling the other above marginal cost. Figure 5 depicts such an instance.
Figure 5: In pink, market-clearing prices outside V ; in purple, market-clearing in the
interior of V ; and in blue, the rest of the support V .
When costs are positive, optimal market-clearing prots no longer need to be strictly
positive. When the minimal valuation of each product within V + is much below its marginal
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cost, it may be hard to clear the market at a positive prot. The next remark provides
a simple su¢ cient condition for optimal market-clearing prots to be strictly positive. As
before, let v+i denote the minimal value for variety i in the support V
+. With costs, we
say that varieties are unranked if not all buyers weakly prefer one variety to the other when
prices equal marginal costs (that is, if for any i there is a v 2 V such that vi   ci > vj   cj).
Remark 3 Optimal market-clearing prots are strictly positive if varieties are unranked and
v+i  ci for some variety i 2 fa; bg.
The remark intuitively holds, because it is always possible to clear the market and make
positive prots by setting prices pi = ci and pj > cj whenever varieties are unranked.
Lemma 2 immediately extends to settings with positive marginal costs, as its proof did
not impose much discipline on the sellers preferences. Thus, even with positive costs, equi-
librium prots remain bounded below by optimal market-clearing prots. Furthermore, as in
Proposition 2, stationary equilibrium prots still converge to optimal market-clearing prots
as  converges to 1. As before, when  is close to 1, the measure of active buyers will be
arbitrarily small after any nite time T (for the seller not to protably deviate by selling
units sooner), and prots will not exceed by much the static optimal market-clearing prots
(when buyers are patient). We summarize the two key Coasian observations in the following
remark.
Remark 4 If the market is regular, optimal market-clearing prots:
(1) are a lower bound on perfect Bayesian equilibrium prots;
(2) coincide with the limit of weak Markov equilibrium prots as  converges to 1.
Relaxing the Permanent Exit Assumption: It may seem that our interpretation of
Coases seminal result as market-clearing relies on the assumption (implicit in some of the
literature) that buyers permanently exit the market upon purchasing a variety. Such an
assumption is without loss: (i) if every buyer purchases its preferred variety; or (ii) if goods
are consumed when purchased thereby dissipating their need forever; or (iii) if players commit
to stay out of the market upon purchasing the good. The rst scenario is not so uncommon
when the measure is symmetric (for instance, for discordant symmetric distributions). In
those circumstances, pricing in the baseline model may be e¢ cient (as varieties are always
sold at the same price) and may eventually clear the market while strictly exceeding minimal
values. The second scenario is compelling for goods that are durable, but that are consumed
once purchased (such as many services). After all, in these models, durability simply amounts
to sales permanently depleting the demand for the good. In other markets, however, it may
be more plausible to assume that buyers remain active in the market until they purchase
21
their preferred variety. If so, they may scrap the variety they purchased in an earlier round
once their preferred variety is su¢ ciently cheap.
To analyze this setting, we postulate that when a buyer v 2 V purchases any variety
i 2 fa; bg of the durable good, their value for each variety transitions to
v0i = 0 and v
0
j = vj   vi.
Thus, upon purchasing a variety, the value of that variety fully depletes, whereas the value
for the other variety amounts to the di¤erence between the two original values. The latter is
natural, as the change in value from scrapping variety i to purchase j amounts to vj   vi.
As pointed out in the section on costs, our notion of market-clearing simply amounts to
full depletion of gains from trade. Applying this denition to settings in which buyers remain
active upon making a purchase changes the shape of the market-clearing set as follows:
M =

p 2M j vi   pi  vj   pj ) cj  vj   vi for all v 2 V +
	
.
This denition states that a price clears the market if: (i) every buyer purchases a variety;
and (ii) the marginal cost of supplying variety j to any buyer purchasing variety i exceeds
their change in value. Therefore, the market must clear whenever the change in price is
smaller than the cost of every variety, or formally
M  p 2M+ j   cb  pa   pb  ca	 .
Moreover, the latter must hold with equality whenever ci  maxv2V + vi  vj for every variety
i. Market-clearing prices will thus be e¢ cient (as pa = pb) when the marginal cost of each
product equals zero, but not otherwise. As before, provided that v  c for all values in the
support V , optimal market-clearing prots equal zero if and only if products are identical
and there are no gaps (that is, c 2 V ). More generally, as in the previous part of the section,
optimal market-clearing prots are strictly positive if varieties are unranked and v+i  ci for
some variety i 2 fa; bg.
Even in this setting, equilibrium prots remain bounded below by static optimal market-
clearing prots, since the argument establishing Lemma 2 readily applies to all prices inM.
As was the case with permanent exit, stationary equilibrium prots remain uniquely pinned
down by static optimal market-clearing prots when price revisions are instantaneous. The
intuition is again similar to that of Proposition 2, and it relies on the measure of switch-
ers remaining small when players are patient and prices are close to market-clearing. We
summarize these conclusions in the following remark, which is proven in the online appendix.
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Remark 5 If buyers remain active and the market is regular, optimal market-clearing prots:
(1) are a lower bound on perfect Bayesian equilibrium prots;
(2) coincide with the limit of weak Markov equilibrium prots as  converges to 1.
When marginal costs equal zero and players remain active, limiting stationary equilibria are
e¢ cient, as all buyers eventually purchase the preferred variety when prices belong to M
(this is the case in the top three panels of Figure 6). In such e¢ cient limiting stationary
equilibria, varieties are not necessarily sold at their minimal value, but rather at the minimal
value of the durable good. For instance, with discordant valuations, there can be scenarios
in which pricing is e¢ cient and in which every variety is sold above its minimal value (see
the top right panel of Figure 6).
(1) Independence (2) Concordance (3) Discordance
Figure 6: Market-clearing set without exit, M , for three possible distributions. The panels
at the top focus on ca = cb = 0, and those at the bottom on ca = cb = c > 0.
When marginal costs are positive though, results are closer to the baseline setting in which
buyers commit to exit. The seller retains its ability to intratemporally price discriminate,
and e¢ ciency is seldom obtained since marginal costs prevent the seller from undercutting
in order to supply buyers who were initially sold the ine¢ cient variety (this is the case in the
bottom three panels of Figure 6). This logic o¤ers a novel rationale for selling high marginal
cost varieties, namely, intratemporal price discrimination in durable goods markets.
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6 Classical Results and Coasian Failures
Relationship to Classical Coasian Results: The paper discussed a dynamic monopoly
problem in which multiple varieties of a product were produced and sold. It extended clas-
sical conclusions on equilibrium pricing and established that in any robust generalization
of Coasian results, static optimal market-clearing would play a role similar to that of the
minimal valuation in the single-variety case. This insight considerably simplied the analysis
of the dynamic game and enabled meaningful generalizations of classical Coasian dynamics.
With more than one variety, intratemporal price discrimination was shown to make up at
least in part for the absence of intertemporal price discrimination caused by the lack of com-
mitment. Although the paper was presented for two varieties, analogous conclusions would
be obtained with more than two varieties.
The table below summarizes classical contributions on dynamic monopoly pricing with
one variety, highlighting which conclusions are specic to this scenario and which generalize
to multi-dimensional settings. In the table, OMCstands for optimal market-clearing prot,
WMEmeans there exists a weak Markov equilibrium with the desired property, Both
means time to clear can be nite or innite, and Minimal Limit Protsmeans all goods
are traded at their minimal value in V in the limit as  ! 1.
Number of Varieties Single Multiple
Gaps No Yes No Yes
OMC 0 + 0 + +
Market Clearing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bound on PBE Prot OMC OMC OMC OMC OMC
Limit WME Prot OMC OMC OMC OMC OMC
Time to Clear Innite Finite Innite Both Finite
E¢ ciency Yes Yes WME Rare Rare
Minimal Limit Prots WME Yes WME No No
PBE Late Mixing No No  Yes Yes
PBE Uniqueness No Yes No No No
We would like to argue that the three consistent phenomena across Coasian settings are: (i)
eventual market-clearing; (ii) optimal market-clearing providing a lower bound on equilibrium
prots; and (iii) optimal market-clearing identifying stationary equilibrium prots. Thus, one
could consider these three aspects as the essence of the Coase conjecture. Other phenomena,
meanwhile, are not robust, in that they depend on the specic assumptions invoked on the
durable goods environment. These phenomena include: the time it takes for the market
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to clear; the e¢ ciency of equilibrium pricing; whether goods are eventually sold at minimal
valuations; whether mixing can take place after the initial period; and equilibrium uniqueness.
Multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria contrasts with the uniqueness result obtained
in the single-variety case with gaps. Multiplicity naturally arises when more than one variety
is for sale because optimal market-clearing prices need not be unique. This observation alone
does not imply that a Folk Theorem holds as in Ausubel and Deneckere 1989. Their seminal
contribution shows how to construct a Folk theorem when a single variety is sold and there
are no gaps. In such settings, the seller can extract the full static monopoly surplus by
following a strategy with a slow price descent. Such a strategy is incentive compatible for the
seller if consumersbeliefs about future prices revert to the stationary equilibrium path upon
observing any deviation. However, for the slow price descent to be incentive compatible,
the stationary equilibrium limit prot must equal 0, and thus there must be no gaps. In
multi-variety settings, it is unclear whether the no-gaps assumption would su¢ ce to deliver
a full-edged Folk theorem, as equilibrium prots may be strictly positive even when there
are no gaps.21 If a Folk theorem were to hold, our analysis would identify the lowest perfect
Bayesian equilibrium prot and the stationary limit payo¤.
As usual, it is possible to interpret our setting as a two-player model of bargaining with
one-sided incomplete information in which the uninformed party always proposes. In this
interpretation, varieties would amount to alternative prospects that the proposer could o¤er
to the receiver to screen their type. If so, our conclusions would establish that the uninformed
party regains some bargaining power by statically screening consumers, since it can extract
surplus even if it has to agree with every possible type of the informed player. Our bargain-
ing interpretation of the Coase conjecture would then amount to immediate agreement in
limiting stationary equilibria and would essentially coincide with optimal market-clearing. If
players were to stay in the market upon purchasing the product, agreement would have to be
renegotiation-proof to guarantee that no player would want to switch varieties at any price
exceeding marginal cost.
Approximating stationary equilibrium prots (with frequent price revisions) with optimal
market-clearing may not just amount to a theoretical curiosity. Instead, such an approxima-
tion could in principle deliver a concrete stepping-stone to inform applied research on durable
goods pricing and to develop product design implications for such markets.
Relationship to Some Coasian Failures: Our analysis is closely related to some known
violations of the classical Coase conjecture. Board and Pycia 2014 considers a durable goods
monopoly problem in which buyers have the option to commit to stay out of the market by
taking an outside option. The outside option amounts to a second variety of the durable
21We defer the full-blown analysis of non-stationary equilibria to future work.
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good that must be sold at a price of zero. They consider settings in which the value of the
outside option is strictly positive for all players (there are gaps) and independent of the value
of the durable good (the left plot of Figure 7 depicts such an environment). Their main
contribution establishes that the monopolist sets a strictly positive price for the durable
good and never undercuts the initial price as the market clears at once. In our setting, their
result holds immediately by Lemma 2. Since the price of the outside option is zero, any
price for the durable good is a market-clearing price. Thus, the monopolist would never
undercut. Furthermore, this holds even without gaps, and even with an arbitrary correlation
structure. Of course, setting the price of the outside option to zero would be suboptimal in
our environment, as any such price prole would belong to the interior of the market-clearing
price set. Still, in our view, Board and Pycias novel contribution should not be classied
as a failure of the Coase conjecture. Rather, our results aim to highlight that the essence of
the Coasian intuition is market-clearing, and not necessarily minimal pricing, zero prots, or
e¢ ciency. Similar considerations apply to Wang 1998, who establishes a result evocative of
Board and Pycia in the context of a two-type model.
Likewise, Hahn 2006 expands on classical conclusions by showing that selling damaged
products can increase the prot of a durable goods monopolist. A damaged product acts like
a second variety with a lower value. In particular, their analysis considers settings in which
the valuations of the two varieties are binary and perfectly correlated (the right plot of Figure
7 depicts such an environment). Similar conclusions hold in our setting independently of the
joint measure of valuations. However, these are again not failures of the Coase conjecture,
but rather its essence, as limit prots again amount to optimal market-clearing prots in our
formulation of the problem. Other similarly classied Coasian failures t this bill.
(1) Outside Options (2) Vertical Di¤erentiation
Figure 7: The left plot depicts the environment studied in Board and Pycia 2014; the right
plot depicts alleged Coasian failures with vertical di¤erentiation.
Our conclusions hold even when no buyer values one of the two varieties. In essence, if the
monopolist could pay buyers a penny (or any small amount) to permanently exit the market,
the Coasian prot would no longer amount to the smallest valuation in the support. Instead,
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the monopolist would be able to approximately extract the full monopoly prot as any price
would clear the market. Hence, Coasian dynamics would be inessential if the seller was able
trade products of low value that would commit the buyers to exit market. If the penny did
not deplete buyersdemand for the other variety, however, the sellers payo¤ would instead
amount to the smallest valuation (provided that producing the penny was costless). In such
scenarios, high marginal cost varieties would be necessary in order to prevent undercutting
by future selves and to sustain positive prots, as shown in Section 5.
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7 Appendix
Proof Lemma 1. Consider any PBE and any buyer-history ht 2 H^ t. To establish (1),
observe that, since v strictly prefers buying variety i,
vi   pi > maxfvj   pj; U(ht; v)g,
where U(ht; v) denotes the equilibrium continuation value of player v at date t + 1 after
history ht. As buyer v can mimic the strategy of buyer v0 from period t + 1 onwards (by
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accepting and rejecting the very same o¤ers) and since v0j   vj < v0i   vi, it follows that
U(ht; v0)  U(ht; v) P1s=0 s hPk2fa;bg sk(ht; v0) (v0k   vk)i  v0i   vi,
where sj(h
t; v0) denotes the probability conditional on ht that variety j is purchased by v0 at
time t+ s+ 1. But if so, buyer v0 strictly prefers buying variety i, and part (1) follows, since
v0i   pi = vi   pi + (v0i   vi) > maxfvj   pj; U(ht; v)g+ (v0i   vi)
 maxfv0j   pj; U(ht; v0)g.
To prove (2), similarly observe that, since buyer v weakly prefers to buy a variety,
maxi2fa;bgfvi   pig  U(ht; v).
As buyer v can mimic the strategy of buyer v0 from period t+ 1 onwards, it follows that
U(ht; v0)  U(ht; v)  maxi2fa;bg fv0i   vig .
But if maxifvi   v0ig < minifvi   v0ig, then buyer v0 strictly prefers buying a variety, since
maxifv0i   pig  maxifvi   pig+ mini fv0i   vig
> U(ht; v) + maxi2fa;bg fv0i   vig  U(ht; v0).
Similarly, to prove (3), observe that, since buyer v weakly prefers not to buy any variety,
maxi2fa;bgfvi   pig  U(ht; v),
As buyer v0 can mimic the strategy of buyer v from period t+ 1 onwards, it follows that
U(ht; v)  U(ht; v0)  maxi2fa;bg fvi   v0ig .
But if so, buyer v0 strictly prefers not buying any variety, as
maxifv0i   pig  maxifvi   pig  minifvi   v0ig
< U(ht; v)  maxifvi   v0ig  U(ht; v0).
Also, note that (2) immediately implies (4). This follows because on any ray va = vb+k there
exists a cut-o¤ valuation identifying the marginal buyer, and because indi¤erent consumers
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have measure zero when the market is regular.
Proof Lemma 2. To prove the result, it su¢ ces to show that, in any PBE, all consumers
accept any price in M at any information set. Suppose this were not the case. Select any
equilibrium, and let P denote the set of prices that will be accepted by all buyers in any
possible subgame:
P =

p 2 R2  maxi2fa;bg fvi   pig > U((h; p); v) for all (h; v) 2 H  V 	 .
By contradiction, suppose that M is not contained in P (that is, MnP 6= ;). Observe
that p 2 P whenever mini2fa;bg pi <  1. To show the latter, observe that the proof of Lemma
1 implies that the buyersvalue functions at any buyer-history h^ 2 H^ are non-decreasing in
v and have modulus of continuity less than 1, since for v0  v,
U(h^; v0)  U(h^; v)  maxi2fa;bg fv0i   vig .
But then, in any PBE we have that U(h^; v)  1 for all v 2 V . This in turn implies that all
buyers strictly prefer to purchase a variety of the durable good when mini2fa;bg pi <  1, as
maxi2fa;bg fvi   pig > 1 > U(h^; v) for all h^ 2 H^. (2)
As mini2fa;bg pi <  1 implies p 2 P , for any " > 0 there is a price p^ 2 MnP 6= ; such that:
(i) p  p^  ("; 0) implies p 2 P ;
(ii) p  p^  (0; ") implies p 2 P .
To nd such a price p^, let ~pa = infq2 MnP qa, and for some  2 (0; "), let
~pb = infq2 MnP qb s.t. qa  ~pa + ,
where mini2fa;bg ~pi   1 by (2). Then set a p^ to be any price in MnP such that p^  ~p+(; ).
Such a price must exist by denition of ~p for all su¢ ciently small . Moreover, (i) holds since
p 2 P when pa  p^a  " < ~pa, by denition of ~pa; while (ii) holds since p 2 P for any pa  p^a
when pb  p^b   ", by denition of ~pb.
But, when " is su¢ ciently small,
maxi2fa;bg fvi   p^ig > maxi2fa;bg fvi   p^i + "g , " < 1  

maxi2fa;bg fvi   p^ig .
If so, all consumers would accept p^ at any seller-history h 2 H. If a type were to reject an
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o¤er, they could agree no sooner than tomorrow, and the most they could expect any one
price to drop is " as any further drop would lead to acceptance by all buyers. Thus, for all
v 2 V ,
maxi2fa;bg fvi   p^i + "g  U((h; p^); v).
But, this in turn would imply that
maxi2fa;bg fvi   p^ig > maxi2fa;bg fvi   p^i + "g  U((h; p^); v) for any h 2 H.
As p^ =2 P , the latter contradicts the denition of P and consequently establishes (1) and
(2). Because every consumer buys when prices belong to M , the seller can secure a payo¤
arbitrarily close to the optimal market-clearing prots (A) > 0 (where A = A(h) denotes
the active player set associated with history h) by choosing a price in M . Part (3) then
follows.
Proof Lemma 3. To prove (1), x a PBE. Let At = A(ht) denote the support of the
measure of active players associated with a history ht 2 H of length t. Suppose that there
exists a history hs 2 H with F(As) > 0 such that
F(As) F(At) < 
for any active player set At that may arise with positive probability at any date t > s as a
result of equilibrium play after history hs. At such a history, the equilibrium prot of the
seller must be bounded by (hs) < , as no variety is ever sold at a price higher than 1 (the
highest value in the initial support). As optimal market-clearing prots are strictly positive
whenever F(As) > 0 though, (As) >  for  su¢ ciently small. But if so, a contradiction
would emerge as the seller would prefer to immediately clear the market:
(hs) <  < (As).
Thus, when  < (As), there always exists a continuation-history ht that occurs with positive
probability on the equilibrium path such that
F(As) F(At) > .
The latter however implies that for any " > 0, there exists a T su¢ ciently long such that, at
any history hT 2 H consistent with equilibrium play,
F(AT ) < ".
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To prove that the market always clears in nite time when vg > 0, consider any sequence
of sets fAtg1t=0 satisfying At+1  At  V . Denote by A1 the limit of this sequence, A1 =
\1t=0At. We begin by establishing a preliminary result, proven in the online appendix, which
shows that price discrimination gains must become small for at least one of the two varieties.
Remark 6 If At satises Lemma 1 for any t  0 and F(A1) = 0, then for all " > 0, there
exists a T su¢ ciently large such that jvi   v0ij  " for some i and for all v; v0 2 AT .
For any set A  V , dene vg(A) = minv2A vg and vg(A) = maxv2A vg. Fix an equilibrium.
Consider any innitely long history h1 consistent with equilibrium play. Next we establish
that vg(A1) = vg(A
1). If this were not the case, the previous arguments would imply that
vj(A
1) = vg(A1), where j denotes the variety with non-negligible price discrimination gains.
But, if so, for any " > 0 there must exist a t su¢ ciently large and a sub-history ht of h1
with At = A(ht) such that:
(a)
vj(At)  vg(A1) < "; (b) vi(At)  vi(At) < "; (c) 1  Fj(vg(A1)jAt) < ".
If so, however, a contradiction emerges for " su¢ ciently small, since

 
ht

=F(At)  (1  Fj(vg(A1)jAt))vj(At) + Fj(vg(A1)jAt)vi(At)
 "vj(At) + (1  ")vi(At)  "vg(A1) + (1  ")vi(At) + "
< maxpj(1  Fj(pjjAt))pj + Fj(pjjAt)vi(At)  (At)=F(At).
The rst inequality holds as the seller instantaneously sells all products at the highest possible
value, given that buyers with vj < vj(A1) never purchase variety j by Lemma 1. The second
and third inequalities are immediate consequences, respectively, of (c) and vj(At) > vi(At),
and of (a) and (b). The fourth inequality relies on the fact that when " is su¢ ciently small,
the optimal pj 2 (vi; vg(A1)), as by choosing such a price it is possible to bound prots away
from vi(A
t). The nal inequality is trivial and relies on the fact that we have checked for
maximized prots only on a subset of M . Thus, for any " > 0, there exists a T  such that
vg(A
s)  vg(As) < " for all s  T .
As vg > 0, by Lemma 1 we know that vg(A) > 0 for any A  V . Next, we show that
whenever vg(A)  vg(A)  ", the seller prefers to immediately clear the market. Denote the
residual surplus given A by
S(h) =
R
A
max fva; vbg dF (vjA)  vg(A)F(A).
33
If so, there exists an  2 (0; 1) such that
 (h) < S(h) + (1  )S(h)
as the seller cannot instantaneously extract the full surplus with a linear price. Since we also
have that (A)  vg(A)F(A) by Remark 1, it follows that
 (h)  (A) < S(h) + (1  )S(h)  vg(A)F(A)
= ( +    )S(h)  vg(A)F(A)  F(A)

( +    )vg(A)  vg(A)

= F(A) vg(A)  vg(A)  F(A) "  (1  )vg(A) ,
where  =  +     2 (0; 1) for all ;  < 1. However, we cannot have that  (h) < (A),
by Lemma 2, and so the market clears instantaneously whenever
"  vg(A) (1  ) =.
Thus, if vg > 0, there exists a period T
 such that all buyers purchase a variety before date
T  in any PBE, given that vg(As)  vg(As) < " for all s  T .
Proof Proposition 1. To begin, we assume that there are gaps, and so vg > 0. If so, by
Lemma 3, in any PBE there exists a time T such that a measure F(V ) of buyers purchases a
variety of the durable good before date T . For all values of z 2 N, we inductively construct
an equilibrium, and we prove its existence in a corresponding game in which, from some date
z onwards, the seller must forever set prices in M . Then we argue that this establishes the
existence of a WME even in unrestricted games, provided that T < z. Finally, we establish
that the proof generalizes to the vg = 0 case by equicontinuity.
Let K(V ) = fA  V j A is non-empty and compactg. Let s 2 f0; :::; zg denote the num-
ber of periods before prices must belong to M . While proving existence, we allow buyers
beliefs (and thus the sellers strategy) to depend on the time to market-clearing, s. We then
show that this is without loss as current prices fully pin down the time it takes for the market
to clear. When s = 0, the seller must instantaneously set p 2M . For any mixed strategy set
by the seller  2 P (M), denote the expected payo¤ of a buyer with value v when s = 0 by
U0(; v) =
R
M
maxi fvi   pig d(p).
Fix any active player set A 2 K(V ). Denote demand for variety i 2 fa; bg when s = 0 by
d0i (pjA) = F(vi   pi > maxfvj   pj; 0gjA).
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With a minor abuse of notation, let pd0(pjA) = pad0a(pjA) + pbd0b(pjA). By Lemma 1, when
the market is regular, the sellers beliefs about the measure A of active buyers are fully
pinned down by the support A of the measure A. Denote the best response of the seller who
believes that only players in A are active when s = 0 by
B0(A) = arg max2P(M)
R
M
pd0(pjA)d(p).
Let 0(A) = (A) denote the value of this program, or the prot that the seller would make
if the market had to clear and only buyers in A were active.
The best response correspondence B0(A) is upper-hemicontinuous22 in A and has non-
empty, compact, convex values by Berges maximum theorem.23 The theorem applies here be-
cause both K(V ) and P (M) are Hausdor¤, the objective function is continuous in both  and
A (as d0i (pjA) is continuous in A by regularity), and the solution belongs to P
 
M \ [0; 1]2
which is non-empty and compact.24 The convexity of the correspondence B0(A) follows from
the linearity in . For any A 2 K(V ), any p 2 [0; 1]2, and any  2 P (M), let A0(p; jA)
identify those buyers who prefer not to purchase a variety at price p when s = 1 if they
expect prices to be drawn from  in the following period:
A0(p; jA) = v 2 A j maxi fvi   pig  U0(; v)	 .
Next, observe that for any A 2 K(V ) and any p 2 [0; 1]2, there exists a 0 2 P  M \ [0; 1]2
such that
0 2 B0(A0(p; 0jA)). (3)
The latter follows because A0(p; jA) is continuous in , as U0(; v) is linear and hence
continuous in . Moreover, A0(p; jA) is single-valued in the space K(A) as a function of ,
and it is thus convex-valued as a function of . Therefore, the correspondence B0(A0(p; jA))
has a closed graph and convex values, since B0 is upper-hemicontinuous and has non-empty,
compact, convex values. As P  M \ [0; 1]2 is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a
locally convex Hausdor¤ space, the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg xed point theorem applies.25
Hence, equation 3 has a non-empty compact set of xed points. For any initial price p quoted
by the seller, these xed points identify the sellers equilibrium strategy when s = 0 if in the
previous period the price was p and the active player set was A. For any p 2 [0; 1]2, label
any such xed point as 0(pjA) 2 P(M). Moreover, if p and  are such that for some variety
22More specically, the best response correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous when the Hausdor¤ metric
is applied to its domain K(V ).
23For the relevant statement of the Maximum Theorem see Aliprantis and Border 2006 page 570.
24P(M \ [0; 1]2) is compact because M \ [0; 1]2 is compact. See Aliprantis and Border 2006 page 513.
25For the statement of the relevant Fixed Point Theorem see Aliprantis and Border 2006 page 583.
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i 2 fa; bg,
vi   pi < maxfvj   pj; U0(; v)g for all v 2 A,
then it is possible to reduce pi to p0i < pi while leaving the active player set una¤ected. Hence,
if 0(pjA) is a xed point at p, it is also a xed point at such a price prole p0 = (p0i; pj).
Next, by induction, we show that if an equilibrium exists when prices must belong to M
after s   1 periods, then an equilibrium also exists when prices must belong to M after s
periods. Fix any A 2 K(V ). Suppose that the seller sets price prole p when the market has
to clear in at most s periods. Denote by s 1(pjA) the buyersbeliefs about the distribution
prices of in the following period. First, conjecture that an equilibrium exists in which the
seller follows a strategy s 1(p) that is independent of A on the equilibrium path, and then
verify that such an equilibrium indeed exists. If this were the case, buyersbeliefs would also
be independent of A by consistency as s 1(p) = s 1(p) (where s 1(p) exists by induction
hypothesis).
Given these beliefs, for any mixed strategy of the seller  2 P  [0; 1]2, denote the expected
payo¤ of buyer v when prices must belong to M in at most s periods by
U s(; v) =
R
[0;1]2
maxfmaxi fvi   pig ; U s 1(s 1(p); v)gd(p).
Denote demand for any variety i 2 fa; bg when prices must belong toM in at most s periods
by
dsi (pjA) = F(vi   pi > maxfvj   pj; U s 1(s 1(p); v)gjA).
To maintain stationarity of the equilibrium strategy, select equilibria in which the seller only
sets prices such that for each variety i 2 fa; bg, there exists a buyer v 2 A satisfying
vi   pi  maxfvj   pj; U s 1(s 1(p); v)g.
This is without loss when the measure is regular, because for any price p violating the
condition, there is a price p0 satisfying it which: (1) leads to the same set of xed points
(and so we can set s 1(p0jA) = s 1(p)); and (2) raises the same prot for the seller, as
ds(pjA) = ds(p0jA). Let M s(A)  [0; 1]2 denote the compact set of prices fullling this
requirement.26 In such equilibria, for any p 2 M s(A) and for any truncation A 2 K(V )
fullling Lemma 1 such that A  A, we have that
As 1(p; s 1(p)jA) = As 1(p; s 1(p)jA).
26In the single-variety case, this would amount to the set of prices at which the active buyer with the
highest value is indi¤erent between buying and not buying the durable good.
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Hence, any price inM s(A) fully determines the active player set in the following period, and
consequently buyersbeliefs about future prices do not depend on A when such prices are
quoted. Clearly, buyersbeliefs must depend also on A even in a stationary equilibrium if
prices outside M s(A) are quoted, because such prices no longer determine the active player
set in the continuation game.
Given these beliefs, denote the best response of the seller who believes that only players
in A are active when the market clears in at most s periods by
Bs(A) = arg max2P(Ms(A))
R
[0;1]2
pds(pjA) + s 1(As 1(p; s 1(p)jA))d(p).
Let s(A) denote the value of this program. The best response correspondence Bs(A) is
upper-hemicontinuous in A and has non-empty, compact, convex values by Berges maxi-
mum theorem. As before, the theorem applies here because both K(V ) and P (M s(A)) are
Hausdor¤, the objective function is continuous in both  and A (as both dsi (pjA) is continu-
ous in As 1(p; s 1(p)jA)), and the solution belongs to P (M s(A)) which is non-empty and
compact. The convexity of the correspondence Bs(A) follows again from the linearity in .
For any A 2 K(V ), any  2 P (M s(A)), and any p 2 [0; 1]2, let As(p; jA) identify those
buyers who prefer not to purchase a variety at price p if they believe that prices will drawn
from  in the following period and that the market clears in at most s periods:
As(p; jA) = fv 2 A j maxi fvi   pig  U s(; v)g .
As before, for any p and any A, there exists a s 2 P (M s(A)) such that
s 2 Bs(As(p; sjA)). (4)
The latter follows because As(p; jA) is continuous in , as U s(; v) is linear and hence
continuous in . As(p; jA) is single-valued in the space K(V ) as a function of , and it is
thus convex-valued in . And again, the correspondence Bs(As(p; jA)) has a closed graph
and convex values since Bs is upper-hemicontinuous and has non-empty, compact, convex
values. As P (M s(A)) is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a locally convex Hausdor¤
space, the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg xed point theorem again applies. Thus, equation 4 has
a non-empty compact set of xed points. For any p, label any such xed point as s(pjA).
These xed points identify the sellers equilibrium path pricing strategy after price p has
been quoted at active player set A when the market has to clear in at most s periods. This
concludes the inductive step and proves equilibrium existence. Of course, when s = z, prices
are set so that z 2 Bz(V ).
37
In each of the constructed equilibria, the sellers strategy depends on the time to clearing
s, on the active player set A, and on the price quoted in the previous period p, since such
a price identies buyers beliefs. To construct a WME, we need the buyers strategies to
depend only on the current price. Since any price p quoted on the equilibrium path by the
seller at s belongs toM s(A), the active player set in the following period is independent of A.
Hence, the sellers strategy and the buyersbeliefs depend only on p and s, and not on A, on
the equilibrium path. In particular, in any such equilibrium, for any history h 2 H t of length
t 2 f0; :::; z   1g and for any p 2M z t(A(h)), we have that (h; p) = z 1 t(p) = z 1 t(p).
If, instead, a price p =2 M z t(A(h)), buyers need to consider A(h) in order to identify a
corresponding price p0 2 M z t(A(h)) which raises the same prot to the seller and pins
down their beliefs about the price evolution to z 1 t(p0). Nevertheless, the strategy of any
active buyer in A(h) coincides by construction at p and p0. In these equilibria, deviating at
s+ 1 from setting a price p to setting a price p0 in the support of s(pjA) leads to the same
continuation play as if the seller had sold at price p at date s+ 1 followed by p0 at s. Hence,
skipping a period does not a¤ect the active player set in the continuation game.
Provided that z > T , the sellers strategy and consequently the buyersstrategies can
also be made independent of the time s it takes to clear the market. To show this, dene
s(p) = pds(pjV ) + s 1(As 1(p; s 1(p)jV )).
Next, let X0 = M and Xs =

p 2 [0; 1]2 nXs 1 j s+1(p) = s(p)	 for any s 2 f1; :::; zg. For
z > T , the collection fXsgzs=0 partitions [0; 1]2 by Lemma 3. Intuitively, Xs identies those
prices at which the seller does not benet from having s + 1 periods rather than s periods
to clear the market, but at which the seller would su¤er by having to clear the market in
fewer than s periods. Then, the strategy of the seller only depends on the price posted in
the previous period, since for any history h 2 H,
(h; p) = (p) =
(
z if p = ;
s(p) if p 2 Xs+1 .
Naturally, the strategy is then an equilibrium of the restricted game, since: (i) the seller
maximizes the present value of prots given its beliefs about the active player set; (ii) buyers
maximize the present value of surplus given the expected pricing path; (iii) buyersbeliefs are
consistent with the sellers strategy; and (iv) the sellers and buyersbeliefs about the active
player set are correct (provided that a measure zero of buyers has deviated). The previous
argument also establishes WME existence in the unrestricted game z =1 whenever vg > 0.
In fact, the sellers strategy cannot be a¤ected by the constraint (h) 2 P (M) when z  T ,
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because prices necessarily belong to M in at most T periods by Lemma 3, and because all
buyers purchase when prices belong to M by Lemma 2. Furthermore, these equilibria are
indeed weak Markov equilibria, as the buyersstrategies depend only on current prices p.
The nal step deals with games in which vg = 0, and its proof can be found in the online
appendix.
Remark 7 If vg = 0, a weak Markov equilibrium exists.
The proof of the remark rst constructs a sequence of games with vg > 0 that converges
to the original game, then shows that the WME of the games in the sequence converge by
equicontinuity to a weak Markovian equilibrium of the limit game in which vg = 0.
Proof Proposition 2. Fix a weak Markovian equilibrium f; g. We shall omit the
dependence on f; g to simplify notation. Let  = e r and consider what happens when
 converges to 0. As the buyersstrategies are stationary, denote by U^(p; v) the equilibrium
expected payo¤ of a buyer with value v when p was the last price quoted by the monopolist.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, for any quoted price p, dene the equilibrium path active
buyer set as
A^(p) =
n
v 2 V j maxi fvi   pig  U^(p; v)
o
.
For any price pt, with a minor abuse of notation, denote by Di(pt) the set of buyers who
purchase variety i at such a price:
Di(p
t) =
n
v 2 A^(pt 1) j vi   pti > maxfvj   ptj; U^(pt; v)g
o
,
and denote by di(pt) the measure of this set. Let ^(pt) denote the equilibrium mixed strategy
of the seller when the set of active buyers is A^(pt), and let E^ [ j pt] denote the expectation with
respect to this distribution. If v 2 Di(pt), buyer v prefers purchasing variety i immediately
over purchasing the preferred variety tomorrow:
vi   pti  E^[maxfvi   pt+1i ; vj   pt+1j g j pt].
Thus, the expected price reductions at histories with dti > 0 satisfy
vi(1  )  E^[maxfpti   pt+1i ; pti   pt+1j + (vj   vi)g j pt]. (5)
Let ^(pt; pt 1) denote the present discounted value of equilibrium prots when the active
player set is A^(pt 1) and the price set by the seller is pt:
^(pt; pt 1) = ptd(pt) + E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
.
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Because of the stationarity of buyers strategies, the sellers present discounted value of
equilibrium prots depends only on the distribution of active buyers (which is summarized
by its support A^(pt 1)) and not on the entire history of play ht. For a strategy to be an
equilibrium, setting a price pt in the support of ^(pt 1) at date t and selling according to
^(pt) at date t+ 1 must be more protable than selling according to ^(pt) directly at date t.
Formally, P
i p
t
idi(p
t) + E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
 E^
h
^(pt+1; pt 1) j pt
i
. (6)
For any price pt+1 in the support of ^(pt), denote by Ki(pt+1) the set of buyers who were
expected to purchase variety i at price pt and that keep consuming the variety i at price pt+1.
Similarly, denote by Si(pt+1) the set of buyers who instead switch from variety i to variety
j. Because the equilibrium is weak Markovian and the active player set depends only on the
current prices pt+1, these sets simplify to
Ki(p
t+1) =

v 2 Di(pt) j vi   vj  pt+1i   pt+1j
	
,
Si(p
t+1) =

v 2 Di(pt) j vi   vj  pt+1i   pt+1j
	
,
where indi¤erence is unimportant by absolute continuity. Denoting the measures of the two
sets by ki(pt+1) and si(pt+1), respectively, condition (6) can then be rewritten as follows:
R =
P
i E^[(p
t
i   pt+1i )ki(pt+1)| {z }
Discrimination Gain
+ (pti   pt+1j )si(pt+1)| {z }
Substitution E¤ect
j pt]  (1  )E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
| {z }
Deferral Loss
. (7)
Fix any real time T^ . The number of periods between 0 and T^ amounts to T^ = and diverges
to innity as ! 0. Because of this, for any value  > 0 there exists a  su¢ ciently small
such that da(pt)+db(pt)   in almost every period t  T^ =. In particular, da(pt)+db(pt) > 
for at most 1= periods, as the market would clear by date T^ otherwise. Let H denote the
set of histories of length T^ = that can occur with positive probability when players comply
with the equilibrium strategies. We aim to show that for any h 2 H there exists a pt 2 h
such that the expected stationary equilibrium prot of the seller E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
 
for some constant  > 0 independent of . The latter would imply that after any history
in H, only a few players could be active, as E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
always exceeds optimal
market-clearing prots by Remark 1, and as optimal market-clearing prots can be small
only when the measure of active buyers is small by Lemma 2. But, if almost all buyers were
to purchase before date T^ , prices would necessarily be close to market-clearing by date T^
(as buyers would never pay more than their value for a product). By choosing T^ su¢ ciently
small, the cost of delaying consumption by any real time T^ would then vanish, and hence
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no buyer would purchase a variety unless prices were close to the expected market-clearing
price. The latter would then imply that the sellers initial prot would be close to a static
market-clearing prot for any  su¢ ciently small.
To conclude, we show that prots must become small before date T^ = when  is small.
Fix any history h 2 H. The conclusion obviously holds when there exists a pt 2 h such that
da(p
t) + db(p
t) = 0, as E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
= 0 by (7). So, begin by considering prices pt 2 h
such that da(pt) + db(pt)  . The left hand side of (7) can be rewritten as:
R =
P
i E^[p
t
i   pt+1i j pt]di(pt) + E^[(pt+1i   pt+1j )(si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1)) j pt].
By (5), we have that whenever di(pt) > 0,
E^[pti   pt+1i j pt]  (1  ).
Thus, at such a history, the desired conclusion would hold if for all  there would exist some
0 < K such that
E^[(pt+1i   pt+1j )(si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1)) j pt]  (1  )0,
as E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
 (2 + 0). If instead the converse inequality held for all 0 < K,
there would exist prices pt+1 in the support of ^(pt) such that
(pt+1i   pt+1j )(si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1)) > (1  )K.
At such prices pt+1, we would have that
pt+1i > p
t+1
j ) si(pt+1) > (1  )K,
pt+1i < p
t+1
j ) sj(pt+1) > (1  )K.
Moreover, at such prices, some players would necessarily switch their demand decision, as
si(p
t+1)   sj(pt+1) 6= 0. If so, at pt+1 there would exist a type v  (1; 1) that would be
indi¤erent between the two varieties (that is, vi   pt+1i = vj   pt+1j ) and willing to purchase
at the current price by Lemma 1.27
When such a type v exists, condition (5) implies that
(1  )  E^[maxfpti   pt+1i ; ptj   pt+1j + (1  )(ptj   pti)g j pt].
27If si(pt+1) > 0, the latter would follow by taking any type v 2 Si(pt+1) and then considering v =
(vi; vi   pt+1i + pt+1j ).
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Given that (pta   ptb) 2 [ 1; 1] for the market not to clear, this in turn implies that
2(1  )  E^[maxfpti   pt+1i ; ptj   pt+1j g j pt].
With minor manipulations, the left hand side of (7) can be rewritten and bounded as follows:
R =
P
i E^[(p
t
i   pt+1i )(ki(pt) + sj(pt)) j pt] + (pti   ptj)E^[si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1) j pt] 
E^[maxfpti   pt+1i ; ptj   pt+1j g j pt] + (pti   ptj)E^[si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1) j pt].
Hence, either E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
 (2 + 0) for some 0 < K (as desired), or we must have
that
(pti   ptj)E^[si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1)jpt] > (1  )K.
For the latter to be the case, it must be that pti ptj =2 [ (1 )K; (1 )K], as by assumption
we know that
E^[si(p
t+1)  sj(pt+1)jpt] 2 [ ; ].
Thus if pti > p
t
j, there exist prices p
t+1 in the support of ^(pt) such that
si(p
t+1) >
1  
pti   ptj
K.
However, at such prices we must have that
1  
pti   ptj
K < si(p
t+1) < fL(Sti (pt+1))  f
 
pt+1i   pt+1j   pti + ptj
L(Di(pt))
 (f=f)  pt+1i   pt+1j   pti + ptj di(pt)  (f=f)  pt+1i   pt+1j   pti + ptj ,
where the second inequality holds by regularity as si(p)  fL(Sti (p)); the third holds
by absolute continuity given that Si(pt+1) is a subset of Di(pt) with height bounded by 
pt+1i   pt+1j   pti + ptj

; the fourth holds by di(pt)  fL(Di(pt)); and the nal inequality
holds as di(pt)  . Thus, at such histories, the price di¤erence (pti ptj) increases by at least
 with strictly positive probability whenever the di¤erence is positive,
pt+1i   pt+1j   pti + ptj >
f(1  )K
f(pti   ptj)
=  ,
and it similarly declines by at least  whenever it is negative. Moreover, when pti > p
t
j, the
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probability of such an increase in the price di¤erence would necessarily satisfy
Pr(pt+1i   pt+1j   pti   ptj >  j pt)
 Pr((pti   ptj)(si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1)) > (1  )K j pt)
 (p
t
i   ptj)E^[si(pt+1)  sj(pt+1) j pt]=K   (1  )
(pti   ptj)  (1  )
> 0,
by a simple variant of the Markov inequality. But the previous arguments imply that, when-
ever demand is small (da(pt) + db(pt)  ) and prots are large (E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i
>
(2 + K)), the price di¤erence (pti   ptj) has to increase with strictly positive probability
by at least  if it is positive, and it has to decline with strictly positive probability by at least
 if it is negative. If that were the case in every period in which demand was small (which is
almost every period when  is small), the price di¤erence would eventually fall outside the
set [ 1; (1  )K] [ [(1  )K; 1] as the number of periods diverged to innity:
lim
!0
Pr

pti   ptj =2 [ 1; (1  )K] [ [(1  )K; 1] for some t  T^ =

= 1.
If so, the market would be close to clearing before date T^ = with probability 1, as pti   ptj 2
[ (1 )K; (1 )K] would imply that prots were small, while pti ptj =2 [ 1; 1] would imply
that one of the two prices was either smaller than the other or equal to zero (which implies
market-clearing by the proof of Lemma 2). But if so, buyers would expect the market to
almost clear before date T^ =, and so prots would be small (that is, E^
h
^(pt+1; pt) j pt
i

(2 +K)) with probability 1 on the equilibrium path before date T^ =.
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